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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-2-2(3)(j) (1966) to hear appeals from final orders such as an order granting summary 
judgment. "The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction ...over orders, judgments, and decrees 
of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction." The Court of Appeals is granted "pour over" jurisdiction from matters which the 
Supreme Court determines in its discretion and prior to having set the matter for oral argument, 
should be transferred to the Court of Appeals. See Rule 42(a), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This matter was duly "poured over" to the Court of Appeals by order dated 
November 19, 1997, and the appellate case number was changed from 970342 to 970692. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Standard of Review in the Trial Court: 
Motions for Summary Judgment are governed by URCP 56(c), which provides summary 
judgment is appropriate only when "(1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and — 
(2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Any affidavit either in favor of or opposing a motion for summary judgment "must 
contain specific evidentiary facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Treloggan v. 
Treloggan. 669 P.2d 747 (Utah, 1985) (quoting Jones v. Hinkle. 611 P.2nd 733 (Utah, 1980). 
As in this case, where the Appellant does not provide a supporting affidavit in support of 
his motion for summary judgment, but relies on the pleadings and the depositions of the parties, 
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to be effective, the testimony relied upon in the depositions and other sworn statements must be 
admissible into evidence; parol evidence used to vary or interpret the terms of a contract or the 
understanding of parties proffered to construe the meaning of an agreement may not be 
admissible and may be subject to a motion to strike. Rainford v. Rytting. 22 Utah 2nd 252, 451 
P.2nd 769 (1969). 
In a motion for summary judgment any witness, not just a party, who has knowledge of 
the facts, can make an affidavit as to any of the material facts. Western Pac. Transp. Co. V. 
Beehive State Agric. Coop., 597 P2d 854 (Utah, 1979). 
Where it appears to the Court in a motion or counter motion for summary judgment that 
there exists a dispute as to any material fact, summary judgment must be disallowed 
Bill Brown Realty. Inc. v. Abbott 562 P.2nd 238 (Utah, 1977) Even where the parties are not 
in complete conflict with one another, but the understanding, intention, and consequences of 
those facts are vigorously disputed, the matter is not proper for summary judgment, and can only 
be resolved at trial. Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah, 1978). 
Of course, if the court is to grant a motion for summary judgment, the court must 
determine there are no material facts which are in dispute, and the court must look at those facts 
most favorably to the non-moving party. In so doing the court may not consider the weight of the 
testimony or the credibility of the witnesses. Singleton v. Alexander. 19 Utah 2.d 292, 431 P.2d 
126 (Utah, 1967). 
Standard of Review in the Appellate Court: 
On appellate review of an order granting summary judgment from the trial court, the party 
against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all the 
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inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most favorable to him. Morris v. 
Farnsworth Motel. 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953) Hence the same standard as applies at 
trial court level is applied by the appellate court. Durham v. Margetts. 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah, 
1977) 
The appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. Barber v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
Summary judgment is not precluded, however, simply because there remain some fact or 
facts in dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted. Heglar Ranch. Inc. v. 
Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah, 1980) 
The appellate court may rule on facts that are not genuinely not in dispute. Sorensen v. 
Beers. 585 P.2d 458 (Utah, 1978). 
Issues Presented on Appeal: 
The Utah Court of Appeals is asked to determine whether the trial court acted properly 
when it granted to the Plaintiff/Appellee his motion for Summary Judgment, and in so doing, 
quieting title to the four parcels in question in favor of Appellee. 
The case arises out of a non-judicial foreclosure on the sale of four rental units from the 
Appellee to the Appellant on February 8, 1993. Shortly after the parties closed on the properties, 
the Appellant stopped making the monthly installments on the all-inclusive real estate trust deed 
notes. Further, he failed to secure and notify the Plaintiff of the presence of fire insurance on the 
parcels, and allowed at least one of the properties to remain uninhabitable for a significant period 
of time following the filing of the Notices of Default. 
The Appellee filed a Notice of Default on three of the parcels on June 18, 1993, and a 
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Notice of Default on the fourth parcel on October 25, 1993. 
The Appellant claims he called the parties' escrow agent in early July, 1993 to determine 
what was necessary to cure the default and that on July 8, 1993 he brought in a cashier's check 
and cash totaling $7,245.00, sufficient to cover the defaults against three parcels in question. 
While thereafter the Appellant attempted to collect rents for a couple of months following 
July 8, 1993, he made no further payments against the trust deed notes, and has made no further 
payments nor tenders to this date. 
The trial court found the following: 
(1) That almost from the beginning the Appellant defaulted on the trust deeds and trust 
deed notes. 
(2) The initial down payment amounts were due no later than 45 days after signing of the 
trust deed notes, and could be added to the total amounts in default due the Appellant as of June 
18, 1993 in his Notices of Default and for purposes of determining whether the Appellant had 
cured the defaults as of July 8, 1993. 
(3) That in all respects the Notice of Default were appropriate. 
(4) That while the Appellate attempted to cure the defaults on July 8, 1993, there 
remained sums owing which were never paid to cure the defaults on the trust deed notes. 
(5) No attempt was ever made to cure the default on the fourth trust deed note. 
(6) Even assuming the escrow agent was asked by the Appellant what was required to 
cure the defaults, the amount paid failed to cure the default. 
(7) The escrow agent had absolute discretion as to how to apply any payments received, 
absent written direction from both the Appellee and the Appellant. 
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(8) If the non-judicial foreclosures were proper, the Appellant's title could not have been 
slandered. 
Appellant takes issue with nearly all of these findings and urges the court to find that 
there are material issues of fact which remain to be adjudicated, or in the alternative, to find that 
his cross motion for summary judgment against the Appellee should have been granted.. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Rule 42(a) Discretion of Supreme Court to transfer. "At any time 
before a case is set for oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Court 
may transfer to the Court of Appeals any case except those cases within 
the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction. The order of transfer shall be 
issued without opinion, as to the merits of the appeal or the reasons for 
the transfer." 
Section 57-1-24(1), UCA, provides in pertinent part: 
"The power of sale conferred upon the trustee may not be exercised until: 
(1) The trustee files for record, in the office of the 
recorder of each county where the trust property...is situated, a 
notice of default, identifying the trust deed by stating the name of 
the trustor named therein and giving the book and page where the 
trust deed is recorded and a legal description of the trust property, 
and containing a statement that a breach of any obligation for 
which the trust property was conveyed as security has occurred, 
and setting forth the nature of that breach and of his election to 
sell or cause to be sold the property to satisfy the obligation." 
Section 57-1-31, UCA, provides in pertinent part: 
"(1) Whenever all ....of the principal sum of any obligation 
secured by a trust deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in such 
obligation become due or been declared due by reason of a breach or 
default in the performance of any obligation secured by the trust deed, 
including a default in the payment of interest or of any installment of 
principal, or by reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance with 
the terms of the trust deed, taxes, assessments, premiums for insurance, or 
advances made by the beneficiary in accordance with the terms of such 
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obligation with the terms of the such obligation or of such trust deed, the 
trustor....at any time within three months of the filing for record of notice 
of default under such trust deed, if the power of sale be exercised, may 
pay to the beneficiary or his successor in interest the entire amount then 
due under the terms of such trust deed (including costs and expenses 
actually incurred in enforcing the terms of such obligation, or trust deed, 
and the trustee's and attorneys's fees actually incurred, other than such 
portion of the principal as would not then be due had no default occurred, 
and thereby cure the default theretofore existing, and thereupon, had or 
instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued and the obligation and trust 
deed shall be reinstated and shall be and remain in force and effect the 
same as if no such acceleration had occurred." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves an appeal from an order of the trial court granting the 
Plaintiff/Appellee a Summary Judgment against the Defendant/Appellant. Appellee sought to 
Quiet Title in a four parcels of property which Appellant had purchased via trust deeds and trust 
deed notes and on which he is alleged to have defaulted almost from the beginning. 
Appellant claims he brought delinquent amounts current on three parcels where Notices 
of Default had been filed on July ;8, 1993, less than one month after the Notices of Default had 
been filed. He claims that the escrow agent chosen by the parties to receive the funds to be paid 
by the Appellant, had accepted the funds on behalf of Appellee, thus nullifying the Notices of 
Default, and prohibiting the Appellee from proceeding with his non-judicial foreclosure. 
Course of Proceedings: 
On or about September 3, 1993 the Appellee commenced an action for breach of contract 
against the Appellant for failure to make payments under the trust deed notes and associated trust 
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deeds in Murray Circuit Court as Case No. 930008740. (Tr. 1-9) Appellant not only sought 
damages for Appellant's failure to make monthly installments from July 1, 1993 forward, but 
also sought a restraining order, restraining the Appellant from attempting to collect rents. (Tr. 1-
9) 
On October 22, 1993, the parties consented to removing the case to Third District Court 
(Tr. 66). The case was given a new case number of 930906589. 
In the meantime, a non-judicial sale on the three parcels of property took place on 
October 18, 1993. (Tr. 211-220) 
On November 23, 1993, the Appellant filed an Answer and Counterclaim, generally 
alleging that all payments up to and through July 31, 1993 were brought current by the July 8, 
1993 payment to the Escrow Agent and seeking to Quiet Title to the subject properties in the 
Appellant's favor, and seeking an accounting and damages for alleged breach of fiduciary. (Tr. 
71) 
On March 10, 1993 the Appellant filed his first motion for summary judgment against the 
Appellee, seeking to Quiet Title in favor of Appellant. (Tr. 92) No memoranda or supporting 
affidavits were filed in support of Appellant's first motion for summary judgment until August 
11, 1994 (Tr. 152) Objections were timely filed by Appellee, together with counter-affidavits. 
(Tr. 94, 139.) 
Pursuant to a scheduling order dated May 27, 1994, (Tr. 142), Appellant's deposition was 
scheduled for July 19, 1994 May 29, 1994 . The Appellant never appeared at the scheduled 
deposition. Additionally, no responses were received to Appellee's interrogatories and demand 
for production of documents. 
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Appellee filed his own Motion for Summary Judgment on September 29, 1994, along 
with a Memorandum in Support of the Motion and supporting affidavits. (Tr. 176) 
The First Motion for Summary Judgment was heard on November 10, 1994, and the trial 
court denied the cross motions for summary judgment and calendared a scheduling conference 
for December 8,1994. The court further ordered that Appellant McDonald make himself 
available for the taking of his deposition before the scheduling conference. (Tr. 294) 
Accordingly, his deposition was scheduled for November 29,1994. 
Following Appellant's failure to appear for his deposition a second time, Appellee filed a 
motion to strike the pleadings and enter his default. This motion was ultimately denied, inasmuch 
as it was discovered the Appellant was incarcerated in a federal prison in California. (Tr. 326) A 
trial date was nevertheless set for May 4, 1995. (Tr. 327) 
At a hearing on April 4, 1995, the parties tentatively agreed, at the urging of the court, to 
a global settlement of the case, which was reduced to writing and signed by counsel for the 
various parties, dated May 22, 1995 and filed with the court. (Tr. 340) 
On November 20, 1995, the Appellant moved to reconsider the summary judgment (sic.) 
granted by the court. The Appellant claimed he had not been involved in the decision to dismiss 
the claims of the parties and had not signed the Stipulation of Dismissal. (Tr. 347). 
At a hearing on August 29,1996, the court granted Appellant's motion to set aside the 
Order of Dismissal and ordered return the $4,200.00 paid to Appellee which had been paid by 
him in settlement of the claims of Appellant. (Tr. 664) 
At the Court's suggestion, the parties filed cross motions for Summary Judgment a 
second time. (Tr. 700, 818) 
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At a hearing on April 24, 1997, the cross motions for summary judgment was heard, and 
the court granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Appellant, and requested 
specific findings and conclusions be prepared by Appellee's counsel.(Tr. 1064, 1074). These 
were prepared and mailed to counsel for Appellant on June 4, 1997. (Tr. 1073) 
Counsel for Appellant filed objections to the proposed findings and order on June 2, 
1994. (Tr. 1051) 
The order granting summary judgment was signed by the court on June 10, 1997. (Tr. 
1076) 
No ruling was made on the Objections of Appellant, presumably because of lateness, and 
counsel for Appellant filed a Motion for Relief from the Court's Order granting summary 
judgment on June 13,1997. (Tr. 1078). 
Though a Notice to Submit for Decision was filed on the motion for relief by counsel for 
Appellant June 26, 1997 (Tr. 1116); no hearing or decision was made by the Court; though the 
court had scheduled a hearing for September 5, 1997. (Tr. 1123) 
That hearing was superceded by an appeal filed by the Appellant on July 2, 1997, and 
thus taking jurisdiction to hear the objections by the trial court. (Tr. 1118) The Appellant 
certified that no part of the transcript was being requested in connection with the appeal itself. 
(Tr. 1121) 
Statement of Facts 
1. At all times relevant to these proceedings, the Appellee was the owner of four parcels 
of real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, with the following addresses: 
(A) 110 West Commonwealth Ave. 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 
(B) 1734 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
(C) 1646 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
(D) 124-128 West 1700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(See Tr. 1065) 
2. The Defendant had previously entered into a purchase agreement to purchase the four 
properties from a PATRICK McCAULEY, in early 1992, and had had possession of the four 
properties from approximately August, 1992 until the sale by the Plaintiff to the Defendant in 
February, 1993. All of these properties were older structures and were in urgent need of 
maintenance and upkeep. Inasmuch as the Defendant had maintained possession of the 
properties for approximately five months prior to the sale by the Plaintiff, the Defendant was 
well aware of their condition, when he agreed to purchase the properties in an "as is" condition 
from the Plaintiff. (Tr. 851-885 and 1066-1067) 
4. The Defendant further knew that the Salt Lake County Health Department had closed 
the property at 110 West Commonwealth to human habitation in April, 1993, two months after 
he took possession from the Plaintiff. (Tr. 972,973,974, and 1067) 
5. The Defendant did not make the payments due under the trust deed at 110 West 
Commonwealth after it had been shut down by the Health Department in April, 1993. (Tr. 
1067) 
6. The Defendant failed to cure the deficiencies prior to the time provided by the Notice 
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of Default for so doing. (Tr. 1068) 
8 Originally the Defendant claimed he had cured all defaults on all of the properties by 
payment on July 8, 1993 (sic). (Tr. 949) He now admits, however, that he had cured the 
defaults of only three of the properties prior by his payment of July 8, 1993 to Draper Bank and 
Trust. (Ktr. 872) 
9. The properties were sold by the Plaintiff to the Defendant via Trust Deeds and Notes 
dated February 8, 1993. (Tr. 1068) 
10. The parties chose as their escrow agent for purposes of receiving and disbursing funds 
received from the Defendant on the various properties, Draper Bank and Trust, Draper, Utah. (Tr. 
1069) 
11. In addition to the Trust Deeds and Trust Deed Notes, and the Escrow Agreements 
signed by the parties for each of the parcels in question, the parties also executed at closing a 
Purchase Agreement. General terms of each agreement were set forth. (Tr. 889-890) 
12. On June 18, 1993, the Plaintiff caused Notices of Default against three of the 
properties to be filed with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, claiming a breach of the 
obligations by the Defendant under the terms of the Trust Deed and/or Trust Deed Notes. (Tr. 
1070) The properties listed were (A) 110 Commonwealth Ave., (B) 1734 South West Temple, 
and (C) and 1646 South West Temple. 
13. A Notice of Default was recorded against the fourth property, 124-128 West 1700 
South on October 25, 1993, claiming the Defendant had defaulted also on the terms on 
conditions of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note. The Plaintiff then elected pursuant to the 
terms of the Trust Deed to accelerate the balance due on the note. (Tr. 1069-1067) 
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14. On or about July 6, 1993, the Defendant tendered to Draper Bank and Trust, the 
escrow agent for the parties, an Official Check for $6,900.00. (Tr. 1067-1068) At no time did the 
Appellant attempt to contact the Appellee concerning the alleged cure or to find out what, if 
anything additional, was required to cure the default. (Tr. 851-885) 
15. The Defendant made no further attempts following July 6, 1993 to tender or make 
further payments to Draper Bank & Trust under the terms of the escrow agreement with the 
Plaintiff. (Tr. 1068) 
16. Following a demand to do so, Appellant failed to provide Appellee with proof of any 
fire insurance of any of the subject properties prior to June 18, 1993 or at any time thereafter. (Tr. 
974, 980) 
17. According to sworn statements from SANDY STEENECK, an employee who 
maintained records for Draper Bank and Trust for these for these four escrow agreements, the 
Defendant was delinquent as of July 12, 1993 under the terms thereof. (Tr. 963-970) This was 
after the Appellant had made his payment allegedly brining all delinquencies current on the three 
properties subject to Notices of Default on July 8, 1993. MS. STEENECK acknowledged that he 
had brought the four contract monthly payments current, but had failed to pay the "balloon 
payments". 
18. According to the sworn statement of KELLY SORENSON, Senior Account Agent 
for Allstate Insurance, no policies of insurance could be found as having been issued in the 
name of the Defendant, DARYL McDONALD for any of the subject properties at any time. (Tr. 
971) This despite the Defendant's assertions under oath that he had secured insurance for the 
properties as required under the Trust Deeds. (Tr. 851-885) 
Page 12 of 31 
19. On or about September 27, 1993, the Defendant was notified of certain deficiencies 
which existed and which violated both building and health ordinances, by Salt Lake City 
Corporation on the property at 1646 South West Temple. (Tr. 972) 
20. The Defendant made no attempts to make any repairs. (Tr. 962) 
21. Following July 6,1993, the date the Appellant allegedly brought the payments current 
on three of the properties, the Appellee expended considerable sums of money for repairs and 
upkeep. (Tr. 975-977) 
22. At the time of closing, the Defendant entered into an agreement with the Plaintiff to 
purchase the four parcels for no money down; however each of the Trust Deed Notes called for 
one extra monthly payment to be paid within forty-five days of closing. These payments were 
never made by the Defendant. (Tr. 957-970) 
23. Defendant further did not keep up the grounds to the extent that Salt Lake City 
maintenance crews were required to clean the properties of weeds and debris, and for which they 
charged $271.00 that attached as a lien against the properties. The Defendant never paid to 
reimburse the City for these costs. (Tr. 972-974) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellee claims there were several breaches of the trust deeds and/or trust deed notes 
prior to June 18, 1993 which were not cured with the tender of payment by Appellant on July 8, 
1993 of $7,245.00 to Draper Bank and Trust. These breaches are not disputed; though the legal 
effect is in dispute. Appellee asserts summary Judgment was thus appropriate. 
Appellee claims that although the parties' escrow agent was designated by them to 
receive and disburse payments made by the Appellant, the escrow agent was not in a position to 
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know if any alleged default had been or would be cured by receipt of any payment; furthermore, 
the escrow agent was authorized to apply payments to all contracts equally unless otherwise 
agreed upon by the parties. Receipt by the escrow agent of $7,245.00 on July 8, 1993 from 
Appellant does not necessarily cure defaults against three of the properties admitted to be in 
default, and does not waive Appellee's rights to claim defaults exist beyond date of receipt of 
less than sums required to cure a default. 
The Notices of Default filed by the Appellee were sufficiently clear, and sufficiently 
followed statutory guidelines so as not to be defective. 
If the Appellant is in default, Appellee could not be held liable for claimed slander to any 
title claimed by Appellant. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, not challenged by the Appellant, are 
sufficiently clear to uphold court's grant of Summary Judgment in Appellee. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A SIMPLE ACCOUNTING OF RECEIPTS VS. PAYMENTS 
TO HAVE BEEN MADE BETWEEN FEBRUARY 8,1993 AND 
JULY 12,1993 SHOWS THE APPELLANT WAS IN DEFAULT. 
The Appellant should have paid to Draper Bank and Trust the sum of $14,212.50 from 
between February 8,1993 and July 12, 1993. The total payments actually received by Draper 
Bank and Trust during the period in question from the Appellant was only $11,845.00. Total 
funds DARYL McDONALD was deficient as of July 12, 1993 was $2,367.50. Even if you 
deduct the rent that TAGE NYMAN collected prior to 4/20/93 of $1,050.00, this still leaves a 
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balance of $1,117.50 which was unpaid as of July 12, 1993. 
These figures, of course, do not includes costs of foreclosure and legal fees for which the 
Appellant is responsible under the trust deeds and trust deed notes incurred up to July 12, 1993. 
Furthermore, the Appellant had been placed on notice by letter dated April 20 19943 from 
the Appellee that a default under the contract had occurred inasmuch as he had never received 
proof of fire insurance on the four properties; this proof has never been provided to this day. 
The undisputed accounting of monies received vs. amounts due under the contract prior 
to July 8, 1993 is as follows: 
The property at 1646 South West Temple given the contract numbered F-18028 provided 
for the following payment terms: 
Purchase Price: $53,000.00 
Payment Terms: Monthly installments of $550.00 per month commencing with a 
principal payment of $550.00 due 45 days from February 8, 1993, and the remaining principal 
balance of $43,450.00 together with interest at 10.5% per annum payable in monthly installments 
of $550.00 staring March 1, 1993 with monthly installments of the same amount due on the first 
day of each month thereafter until February 1, 2000, when the remaining principal and accrued 
interest was due. A late payment penalty of 5% of the monthly payment was to be assessed is the 
payment was not received within ten days of the payment due date. In addition, the maker was to 
pay all property taxes, when due, and fire insurance premiums when due, and provide the seller 
with evidence of said payments. 
March 1,1993 $550.00 
March 23, 1993 $550.00 
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Late Fee: 
April 1,1993 
Late Fee: 
May 1,1993 
Late Fee: 
June 1,1993 
Late Fee 
July 1, 1993 
Late Fee: 
Total Due: 
$ 27.50 
$550.00 
$ 27.50 
$550.00 
$ 27.50 
$550.00 
$ 27.50 
$550.00 
$ 27.50 
$3,437.50 
The property at 124-128 West 1700 South, given the contract numbered F-18029 
provided for the following payment terms: 
Purchase Price: $45,000.00 
Payment Terms: Monthly installments of $550.00 per month commencing with a 
principal payment of $550.00 due 45 days from February 8, 1993, and the remaining principal 
balance of $43,450.00 together with interest at 10.5% per annum payable in monthly installments 
of $550.00 staring March 1, 1993 with monthly installments of the same amount due on the first 
day of each month thereafter until February 1, 2000, when the remaining principal and accrued 
interest was due. A late payment penalty of 5% of the monthly payment was to be assessed is the 
payment was not received within ten days of the payment due date. In addition, the maker was to 
pay all property taxes, when due, and fire insurance premiums when due, and provide the seller 
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with evidence of said payments. 
March 1, 1993 
March 23,1993 
Late Fee: 
April 1, 1993 
Late Fee: 
May 1,1993 
Late Fee: 
June 1,1993 
Late Fee 
July 1, 1993 
Late Fee: 
Total Due: 
$550.00 
$550.00 
$ 27.50 
$550.00 
$ 27.50 
$550.00 
$27.50 
$550.00 
$ 27.50 
$550.00 
$ 27.50 
$3,437.50 
The property at 1734 South West Temple, given the contract numbered F-18030 provided 
for the following payment terms: 
Purchase Price: $53,000.00 
Payment Terms: Monthly installments of $550.00 per month commencing with a 
principal payment of $550.00 due 45 days from February 8, 1993, and the remaining principal 
balance of $51,450.00 together with interest at 10.5% per annum payable in monthly installments 
of $550.00 staring March 1, 1993 with monthly installments of the same amount due on the first 
day of each month thereafter until February 1, 2000, when the remaining principal and accrued 
interest was due. A late payment penalty of 5% of the monthly payment was also due for any 
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payment made ten days or more past the due date. 
The property at 110 West Commonwealth Ave., given the contract numbered F-18030 
provided for the following payment terms: 
Purchase Price: $53,000.00 
Payment Terms: Monthly installments of $550.00 per month commencing with a principal 
payment of $550.00 due 45 days from February 8, 1993, and the remaining principal balance of 
$51,450.00 together with interest at 10.5% per annum payable in monthly installments of 
$550.00 staring March 1, 1993 with monthly installments of the same amount due on the first 
day of each month thereafter until February 1, 2000, when the remaining principal and accrued 
interest was due. A late payment penalty of 5% of the monthly payment was to be assessed is the 
payment was not received within ten days of the payment due date. In addition, the maker was to 
pay all property taxes, when due, and fire insurance premiums when due, and provide the seller 
with evidence of said payments. 
March 1, 1993 $550.00 
March 23, 1993 $550.00 
Late Fee: $ 27.50 
April 1, 1993 $550.00 
Late Fee: $ 27.50 
May 1,1993 $550.00 
Late Fee: $ 27.50 
June 1, 1993 $550.00 
Late Fee $ 27.50 
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July 1,1993 $550.00 
Late Fee: $ 27.50 
Total Due: $3,437.50 
The property at 110 West Commonwealth Avenue, given the contract numbered F-18031 
provided for the following payment terms: 
Purchase Price: $53,000.00 
Payment Terms: Monthly installments of $650.00 per month commencing with a 
principal payment of $650.00 due 45 days from February 8,1993, and the remaining principal 
balance of $51,450.00 (sic.) together with interest at 12% per annum payable in monthly 
installments of $650.00 starting March 1,1993 with monthly installments of the same amount 
due on the first day of each month thereafter until February 1, 2000, when the remaining 
principal and accrued interest was due. A late payment penalty of 5% of the monthly payment 
was to be assessed is the payment was not received within ten days of the payment due date. In 
addition, the maker was to pay all property taxes, when due, and fire insurance premiums when 
due, and provide the seller with evidence of said payments. 
March 1,1993 $650.00 
March 23,1993 $650.00 
Late Fee: $ 30.00 
April 1, 1993 $650.00 
Late Fee: $ 30.00 
May 1,1993 $650.00 
Late Fee: $ 30.00 
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June 1,1993 $650.00 
Late Fee $ 30.00 
July 1,1993 $650.00 
Late Fee: $ 30.00 
Total Due: $4,050.00 
The total the Appellant should have paid on all four contracts for monthly payments and 
late fees only From February 8,1993 to July 12,1993 should have been $14,212.50. 
The undisputed allocation of payments received from the Appellant by Draper Bank and 
Trust to Contract No. 06658: 
3/1/93 $550.00 
5/1/93 $550.00 
7/1/93 $1,732.50 
The undisputed allocation of payments received from the Appellant by Draper Bank and 
Trust to Contract No. 06659: 
3/1/93 $550.00 
5/1/93 $550.00 
7/1/93 $1,732.50 
The undisputed allocation of payments received from the Appellant by Draper Bank and 
Trust to Contract No. 06660: 
3/1/93 $650.00 
5/1/93 $650.00 
7/1/93 $2,047.50 
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The undisputed allocation of payments received from the Appellant by Draper Bank and 
Trust under Contract No. 06661: 
3/1/93 $550.00 
5/1/93 $550.00 
8/1/93 $1,732.50 
The undisputed total of payments received from the Appellant during the period in 
question by Draper Bank and Trust is $11,845.00. 
POINT II 
THERE ARE NUMEROUS OTHER DEFAULTS WITH RESPECT 
TO EACH OF THE PROPERTIES WHICH WERE NEVER CURED 
BY THE APPELLANT WITHIN THE NINETY-DAY PERIOD. 
Neither party disputes that they entered into written documents represented by Trust Deed 
Noted secured by Trust Deeds dated February 8, 1993 for the purchase by the Appellant from the 
Appellee for each of the four parcels in question. 
Neither party contends they are not bound by the terms and conditions of those Trust 
Deed Notes and Trust Deeds with respect to the four properties in question. 
It is undisputed that the Appellant was in default on the payments to the properties prior 
to the time the Appellee filed the Notices of Default on three of the properties on June 18, 1993. 
The Appellee knew it, Draper Bank and Trust knew it, and the Appellant knew it. 
It is further undisputed that the Appellant knew that one of the properties, 110 West 
Commonwealth Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah, had been condemned to human habitation in April, 
1993, and he was thus unable to make payments on that property prior to the filing of the notice 
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of default. 
It is also undisputed that the Appellant made no farther payments on any of the properties 
after July 8, 1993. 
It is undisputed that the parties agreed to make Draper Bank and Trust as their Escrow 
Agent for the purpose of collecting monies under the various Trust Deed Notes and Trust Deeds 
on the four properties and to pay those funds as directed by the Escrow Agreement for the benefit 
of the Appellee. 
Neither party disputes the accounting given by Draper Bank and Trust with respect to the 
actual funds received from the Appellant. 
The Appellant admits to not having paid the Appellee the extra monthly payment due in 
March, 1993, which was due within forty-five days of closing. 
It is undisputed that the properties were not kept up prior to June 18, 1993 such that Salt 
Lake City Corporation charged for costs of cleaning debris and weeds upon the one of the 
properties, and charged against the property as a lien, the sum of $271.00, and that this sum was 
never reimbursed to the Appellee. 
Each of the All-inclusive Trust Deed Notes signed by the Appellant in favor of the 
Plaintiff called for the payment of a "principal only payment....due within 45 days from February 
8, 1993." 
Each further called for monthly payments (at separate stated amounts) to commence 
March 1, 1993 and to be payable on the first day of each and every month thereafter. 
Each and every All-inclusive Trust Deed Note provided that the maker was to pay 
property taxes and fire insurance premiums when due and to provide the Appellee with evidence 
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thereof. 
Each and every All-Inclusive Trust Deed Note provided that the properties were non-
assignable, non-assumable. and non-transferrable without the written consent of the Appellee. 
Each and every All-inclusive Trust Deed Note provided that there was to be a five percent 
late fee when any payment was not received within ten days of the due date. 
Each and every All-Inclusive Trust Deed Note provides in paragraph nine thereof: 
"In the event that any payment under this Note is not made or any 
obligation provided to be satisfied or performed under this Note or the All-
inclusive Trust Deed securing this Note is not satisfied or performed at the time 
and in the manner required. Holder, at his option and without notice or demand, 
may declare the entire principal balance, all amounts of accrued interest and all 
other amounts then due under the terms of this Note and the All-inclusive Trust 
Deed securing this Note Immediately due and payable." 
Default No. 1: The evidence is undisputed that the Appellant was in fact in default under 
the terms and conditions of the four contracts as of July 12, 1993, in that he had not pay to 
Draper Bank and Trust the total sums then due under the contracts. 
To counter this contention the Appellant claims that he brought all delinquent payments 
current with his payment of $6,900.00 official check and $345.00 cash payment on July 8, 1993. 
To come up with this conclusion, however, the Appellant has to assert that the payments due on 
the four properties on March 23, 1997 was not a monthly payment, but in fact was a "balloon 
payment" not subject to the Demand of Appellee to cure monthly payments; that there were no 
legal fees payable; and that there were no other breaches of the contracts. He further contends 
that without the "balloon payments" being added into the mix, the payment of $7,245.00 on July 
12, 1993 brought all four contracts current. 
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Finally, he contends that even if you add the "balloon payments" into the mix, the 
payment of $7,245.00 on July 12, 1993 exceeds the amount necessary to have brought the three 
contracts then subject to a Notice of Default current The logic there is that there was no need to 
bring the fourth contract current because there had been no demand for payment by the Appellee, 
and no Notice of Default filed. 
Because the Appellant has no evidence, other than parol evidence that he instructed 
WINDY SMITH on July 12, 1993 to cure the defaults with his $7,345.00 payment, there is 
insufficient evidence to show that her allocation of the funds among the four contracts was 
anything other than correct. It is interesting to note that the trial court disregarding what the 
Appellant claimed to have told WENDY SMITH concerning how his payments were to be 
applied, since his affidavit on that issue was both unsigned and was not notarized. (Tr. 300) 
Whether the Appellant was required to make the payment due on each of the contracts 
due on March 23, 1993 to cure the Default Notices is a legal question for this Court to determine. 
Default No. 2: The Appellant in this case has not given any written notice to the Appellee 
providing confirmation of the placement of fire insurance on the four subject properties, despite a 
demand to do so by the Appellee in writing in April, 1993. 
Default No. 3: The Appellant has failed to pay for the costs of foreclosure, interest, legals 
fees and other costs of foreclosure, interest and legals fees incurred in connection with 
it. 
Default No. 4. The Appellant has failed to reimburse the Appellee for his out-of-pockets 
costs incurred in maintaining the property while Appellant has been otherwise disposed of or has 
lost interest in the proeprty. 
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POINT HI 
APPELLANT MADE DRAPER BANK AND TRUST HIS 
AGENT FOR ACCOUNTING PURPOSES AND NOW CANNOT 
CONTEND HIS PAYMENTS WERE FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF CURING DEFAULTS ON ONLY THREE OF THE 
PROPERTIES. 
The Appellant next argues that Draper Bank and Trust is the Appellee's agent, and by 
having accepted the $7,245.00 payment on July 12, 1993, means that the Appellee, himself, has 
waived the right to claim the payments were not then brought current, especially where Draper 
Bank and Trust admits it does not accept partial payments. 
The Appellant claims that Draper Bank and Trust Company employee, WENDY 
SMITH, told the Appellant that the $7,245.00 would cure the default. Interestingly enough, 
WENDY SMITH does not recall having told the Appellant any such thing. 
While it is true that Draper Bank and Trust was Plaintiffs agent for the purposes 
receiving and disbursing funds from the Appellants was the Appellant's agent. In fact, the 
Appellant is the one who insisted upon u collecting and disbursing funds received from the 
Appellant, it is also true that Draper Bank sing an escrow agent, and he selected Draper Bank and 
Trust. If the Appellee is to be bound, then the Appellant must also be bound by the actions of 
the agent. The agent shows that the Appellant never brought the accounts current by July 8, 
1997. 
POINT IV 
THE APPELLANT NEVER TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION 
FEES AND COSTS WITH RESPECT TO CURING THE 
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DEFICIENCIES AGAINST THE THREE PROPERTIES 
Each and every All-inclusive Trust Deed Note provides in paragraph ten thereof: 
"In the event that any payment under this Note is not made, or any 
obligation provided to be satisfied, or performed under this Note or the All-
inclusive Trust Deed securing this Note is not satisfied or performed at the time 
and in the manner required, the defaulting party shall pay any and all costs and 
expenses (regardless of the particular nature thereof and whether or not incurred 
in connection with the exercise of the power of sale provided for in the All-
inclusive Trust Deed securing this Note) which mazy be incurred from time to 
time by the Holder hereof without in any way affecting the liability of such 
parties. No course of dealing between the Maker and Holder in exercising any 
rights hereunder, shall operate as a waiver of rights of Holder. 
When any deficiency declared under a Notice of Default is to be cured, the defaulting 
party, pursuant Section 57-1-31, UCA, and in accordance with paragraph ten of the All-inclusive 
Trust Deed Notes, must also pay and fees and/or legal costs incurred with respect to that default 
incurred by the Beneficiary. It is clear, that Appellant is attempting to argue he cured the default 
without having to account for any legal fees or costs incurred to July 8, 1993, even though he 
admits having fallen behind in payments prior to that point. 
POINT V 
THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT AGAINST THE APPELLANT 
WAS SUFFICIENTLY BROAD TO COVER ANY 
DEFICIENCIES ALLEGED 
The Notices of Default, conform to the requirements of Section 57-1-24(1), UCA, as the 
Appellant admits. 
That section provides in pertinent part: 
"The power of sale conferred upon the trustee may not be exercised until: 
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(1) The trustee files for record, in the office of the recorder of each 
county where the trust property...is situated, a notice of default, identifying 
the trust deed by stating the name of the trustor named therein and giving 
the book and page where the trust deed is recorded and a legal description 
of the trust property, and containing a statement that a breach of any 
obligation for which the trust property was conveyed as security has 
occurred, and setting forth the nature of that breach and of his election to 
sell or cause to be sold the property to satisfy the obligation." 
This section is to be coupled with Section 57-1-31, UCA, which provides in pertinent 
"(1) Whenever all ....of the principal sum of any obligation secured 
by a trust deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in such obligation 
become due or been declared due by reason of a breach or default in the 
performance of any obligation secured by the trust deed, including a 
default in the payment of interest or of any installment of principal, or by 
reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance with the terms of the 
trust deed, taxes, assessments, premiums for insurance, or advances made 
by the beneficiary in accordance with the terms of such obligation with the 
terms of the such obligation or of such trust deed, the trustor....at any time 
within three months of the filing for record of notice of default under such 
trust deed, if the power of sale be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary or 
his successor in interest the entire amount then due under the terms of such 
trust deed (including costs and expenses actually incurred in enforcing the 
terms of such obligation, or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorneys's 
fees actually incurred, other than such portion of the principal as would not 
then be due had no default occurred, and thereby cure the default 
theretofore existing, and thereupon, had or instituted shall be dismissed or 
discontinued and the obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall 
be and remain in force and effect the same as if no such acceleration had 
occurred." 
Appellant claims, however, the Notice of Default must "plainly" tell the Appellant the 
nature of its breach. The cite of Utah State University v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2nd 715, 722 
(Utah, 1982) is not convincing on this point. Neither is the case of Olympus Hills Center. Ltd. 
V. Smith's Food. 889 V2 445 (Utah, 1984). That case deals with defaulted leases, and is not 
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governed by Section 57-1-24(1). Of course, one would expect that a default in a lease would 
detail in particularity the various defaults. 
Examination of the Notices of Default themselves recorded by the Appellee, however, 
reveal the requirements of Section 57-1-24(1), UCA have been satisfied. Furthermore, since the 
default can be cured at any time within 90 days, it is generally not possible to describe exactly 
what is to be paid prior to the termination of ninety days at the outset of the filing of a Notice of 
Default, since amounts generally increase, and costs also increase. A person generally is 
expected to call the Appellee to find out what is necessary to bring all amounts current. The 
escrow agent, for example, would not necessarily know the amount of legal fees or costs incurred 
to bring the contracts current 
In addition, each notice of default called for an acceleration of the remaining principal 
balance then due on each of the trust deed notes in the event the Appellant failed to cure the 
defaults within the ninety-day period. Debt acceleration is a substantive right because it 
provides a beneficiary with the power to bring a single foreclosure action upon default, thereby 
satisfying the entire obligation and discharging the note, rather than forcing the Plaintiff to bring 
repeated collection actions each time the trustor defaults. The beneficiary thereby avoids the 
burden of repeated foreclosures as well at the risk that the security for the debt, the property, will 
be consumed by legal fees, court costs, unpaid interest, etc., before the debt is satisfied. 
Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle. 806 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct. App., 1991). 
POINT VI 
EVEN ASSUMING THE ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANT WAS 
Page 28 of 32 
CURRENT AS OF JULY 8,1993, THERE CAN BE NO SLANDER 
OF TITLE WHERE THE APPELLANT FAILS TO MAKE DEMAND 
UNDER THE STATUTE TO REMOVE THE DOCUMENTS CAUSING 
THE SLANDER. 
The Appellant argues that title to his equitable estate in the properties was slandered by 
the Plaintiff by not having filed a Cancellation of Default as required by Section 57-1-
31(1),(1985), UCA. The Appellant claims that the Plaintiff had an obligation to file a 
Cancellation of Default on the properties once Appellant made the payment to allegedly bring all 
deficiencies current on July 12, 1993. The problem is that Plaintiff contends he did not bring the 
payments current, and the undisputed facts support that contention; secondly, the Appellant failed 
to make any demand upon the Appellant to file any Cancellation of Default once he had paid the 
$7,245.00 on July 12, 1993 as provided by Section 57-1-31(2), UCA. He is simply not entitled 
to any damages even if his claims were founded in truth. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trust Deed Notes and the Trust Deeds given to secure payment under the notes are 
clear on their faces concerning the rights and duties of the Appellant with respect to the Appellee 
in respect to payments and other aspects of the contractual rights and obligations. 
A simple accounting between the parties reveals that in fact the Appellant fell behind in 
payments, and did not cure the totality of those defaults by his payment of $7,245.00 on July 12, 
1993. He further admits not having made any further payments following that date on any of the 
contracts to Draper Bank and Trust. 
The Appellant cannot successfully challenge the findings of fact and the conclusions of 
law, since he has elected to waive that right. He is now bound by those findings and legal 
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conclusions in connection with this appeal. 
If the Appellant was in fact in default under the terms of the Contracts, then Plaintiffs 
actions in foreclosing was valid and Appellant is properly foreclosed under said contracts, and 
his interest therein have terminated. 
This Court should so hold given the undisputed evidence before it. 
DATED t h i y ^ L d a y of December, 1997 
V 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar Number 2993 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 600 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
Fax: (801) 566-8763 
Attorney for Plaintiff: TAGE M. NYMAN 
JUN 1 0 1997 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAGE M. NYMAN, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
DARYL MCDONALD, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> Civil No. 930 906589 
1 Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Counter-motion for Summary 
Judgment having been filed, briefed, and come on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian, Third District Court Judge in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah on Friday, April 24, 
1997 at 8:30 a.m. in his courtroom on the third floor, at 451 South 2nd East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, and Jay R. Mohlman, of Nielsen and Senior, Attorneys and Counsellors at Law appearing 
for and on behalf of the Defendant, Daryl McDonald, and David K. Smith, Attorney and Counsellor 
at Law, appearing with and for and on behalf of the Plaintiff, Tage M. Nyman, and the parties 
previously having submitted their respective brief and affidavits, and/or other exhibits in support 
of their respective positions, and having argued their respective positions before the Court, and the 
Court being fully advised in the premises, and having carefully examined the briefs, and other 
evidence before it, does now make the following: 
0 0 1 f* § x 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT 
2 1. At all times relevant the Plaintiff, TAGE M. NYMAN, was, and still is, a resident of Salt 
3 Lake County, State of Utah. 
4 2. At all times relevant herein, the Defendant, DARYL McDONALD, was a resident of the 
5 State of California, but claimed an interest in four parcels of real property situated in Salt Lake 
6 County, State of Utah, and which is described in paragraph five below.. 
7 3. The Court was asked to ascertain the relative interests of the parties with respect to four 
8 parcels of real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah described in paragraph five 
9 below.. 
10 4. At all times relevant to these proceedings, the Plaintiff was the owner of four parcels of 
11 real property which had been sold to the Defendant under trust deed and notes, and which were 
12 situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, with the following addresses: 
13 I (A) 110 West Commonwealth Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
14 " 
15 
Legal Description: The East 20 feet of Lot 47, Block 1, ROSELAND 
16 || ADDITION, according to the official plat thereof, recorded in the 
Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, Utah. 
17 " 
18 
Sidwell Number: 15-24-227-0000 
Also the following described property: 
Beginning 116.13 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 
19 || L ROSELAND ADDITION; and running thence West 26 feet; thence 
North 84.9 feet; thence south 56 Degrees 19' East 30.2 feet; thence 
20 || South 69.5 feet, more or less to the place of beginning. 
21 I (B) 1734 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
22 " 
23 
Sidwell Number: 15-13-427-007-0000 
24 I Legal Description: 
Parcel 1: Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 12, Block 7 
25 || Five Acre Plat "A", BIG FIELD SURVEY, and running thence 
North 4.35 rods; thence West 9 rods; thence South 4.35 rods; 
26 || Thence East 9 rods to the point of beginning. 
27 || Parcel 2: A non-exclusive easement interest in: 
Beginning at a point 9 rods West of the Northeast corner of 
28 || Said Lot 12, and running thence South 17.4 rods; thence West 
fl'Oi'OW 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
1 rod; thence North 17.4 rods; thence East 1 rod to the point 
of beginning. 
(C) 1646 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Sidwell Number: 15-13-280-021-0000 
Legal Description: All of Lot 1 and the South 11.7 feet of Lot 
42, Block 1, RICHLAND ADDITION, a subdivision of Lots 
1, 2, 3 and 20, Block 10, Five Acre Plat 'A', BIG FIELD 
SURVEY. 
Less and excepting the following described parcel previously 
Conveyed to Salt Lake City Corporation: 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 1, RICHLAND 
ADDITION; thence South 89 Degrees 59 Minutes 30 Seconds 
West 148.500 feet; thence North 0 Degrees 02 Minutes 01 Seconds 
East 8.273 feet; thence South 89 Degrees 27 Minutes 59 Seconds 
East 136.862 feet; to a point on a curvature of a 17.00 foot radius 
curving to the left; thence Northeasterly along the arc of said curve 
17.772 feet to the west line of West Temple Street; thence South 
0 Degrees 02 Minutes 01 Seconds West 11.451 feet along said West 
line to the point of beginning. 
(D) 124-128 West 1700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84116 
Sidwell Number: 05-12-280-026-0000 
Legal Description: The East lA of Lots 2, 3, and 4, Block 1, 
RICHLAND ADDITION, according to the Official Plat 
thereof, recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder, State of Utah. 
Less and except the following: 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Lot 2, Block 1, RICHLAND 
ADDITION; thence North 89 Degrees 59 Minutes 39 Seconds 
East 149.00 feet; thence North 0 Degrees 02 Minutes 01 Seconds 
East 8.428 feet; thence North 89 Degrees 27 Minutes 59 Seconds West 
135.089 feet; thence South 89 Degrees 59 Minutes 57 Seconds West 
1.931 feet to a point on a curvature of a 17.00 foot radius curve to the 
23 || Right; thence Northwesterly along the arc of said curve 13.298 feet 
To the East line of Jefferson Street; thence South 0 Degrees 02 Minutes 
24 I 01 Seconds West 14.642 feet along said East line to the point of 
Beginning. 
25 " 
26 I 5. The Defendant, DARYL McDONALD, had previously entered into a purchase 
27 agreement to purchase the four properties from a PATRICK McCAULEY, in approximately August, 
28 || 1992, and had had possession of the four properties from approximately August, 1992 until the sale 
0 01 Off 
1 by the Plaintiff to the Defendant on February 8, 1993. 
2 6. All of the properties in question were older structures and were in need of deferred 
3 maintenance and upkeep. 
4 7 The properties were sold by the Plaintiff to the Defendant via Trust Deeds and Notes dated 
5 February 8, 1993. 
6 8. In addition to the Trust Deeds and Trust Deed Notes, and the Escrow Agreements signed 
7 by the parties for each of the parcels in question, the parties also executed at closing a Purchase 
8 Agreement. General terms of each agreement were set forth in the Purchase Agreement. 
9 9. The parties chose as their escrow agent for purposes of receiving and disbursing funds 
10 received from the Defendant on the various properties, Draper Bank and Trust, Draper, Utah. 
11 10. The Defendant had maintained possession of the properties for approximately five 
12 months prior to the dosing on February 8, 1993. Because of that fact, the Defendant was aware of 
13 the deteriorated condition of each of the properties prior to February 8, 1993; nevertheless the 
14 Defendant agreed to purchase the properties in an "as is" condition from the Plaintiff. 
15 11. The Defendant further knew that the Salt Lake County Health Department had closed 
16 the property at 110 West Commonwealth to human habitation in April, 1993, two months after the 
17 closing on February 8, 1993. 
18 12. The Defendant made no further monthly payments due under the trust deed at 110 West 
19 Commonwealth after it had been shut down by the Health Department in April, 1993. 
20 13. On June 18,1993, the Plaintiff caused Notices of Default against three of the properties 
21 to be filed with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, claiming a breach of the obligations by the 
22 Defendant under the terms of the Trust Deed and/or Trust Deed Notes. The properties listed were 
23 (A) 110 Commonwealth Ave., (B) 1734 South West Temple, and (C) and 1646 South West Temple. 
24 14. An additional Notice of Default was recorded on October 23,1993 against the fourth 
25 property, 124-128 West 1700 South, claiming the Defendant had defaulted also on the terms on 
26 conditions of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note. The Plaintiff then elected pursuant to the terms 
27 of the Trust Deed to accelerate the balance due on the note. 
28 15. On or about July 12,1993, the Defendant tendered to Draper Bank and Trust, the escrow 
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agent for the parties, an Official Check for $6,900.00 plus a cash payment of $345.00. 
16. The Defendant failed to entirely cure the deficiencies with his payment of $7,245.00 
on July 12, 1993, and no cure was thereafter effected on any of the properties. 
17. The Defendant made no further attempts following July 12, 1993 to tender or make 
further payments on any of the properties to Draper Bank & Trust under the terms of the escrow 
agreement with the Plaintiff. 
18. The Defendant should have paid to Draper Bank and Trust the sum of $14,212.50 from 
between February 8,1993 and July 12,1993. The total payments actually received by Draper Bank 
and Trust during the period in question from the Defendant was only $11,845.00. Total funds Daryl 
McDonald was deficient as of July 12,1993 was $2,367.50 less rent that Tage M. Nyman collected 
prior to 4/20/93 of $1,050.00, leaving a deficiency still due as of July 12, 1993 of $1,117.50. 
19. The Defendant made no effort to ascertain the amount of or to pay any of Plaintiff s 
legal fees or costs incurred in connection with the foreclosure prior to July 12,1993 when he made 
his July 12,1993 payment to Draper Bank and Trust. 
20. The Defendant was responsible for Plaintiffs legal fees and costs of foreclosure to that 
date under the trust deeds and trust deed notes incurred up to July 12, 1993 if he was to have cured 
the default. 
21. Furthermore, the Defendant had been placed on notice by letter dated April 20 1993 from 
the Plaintiff that a default under the contract had occurred inasmuch as he had never received proof 
of fire insurance on the four properties; said proof of fire insurance on the properties was never 
provided to the Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court maintains jurisdiction over the parties to this action and over the subject matter 
of this action. 
2. The parties entered into written documents represented by Trust Deed Notes secured by 
Trust Deeds dated February 8,1993 for the purchase by the Defendant from the Plaintiff for each of 
the four parcels in question which are more particularly described in paragraph four of the Findings 
of Fact.. 
"
5
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1 3. Each of the parties are bound by the terms and conditions of those Trust Deed Notes and 
2 Trust Deeds with respect to the four properties in question. 
3 4. For purposes of adjudication on the mutual motions of the parties for summary judgment, 
4 the Court finds there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the Plaintiff is entitled to 
5 judgment as a matter of law. The Court also finds as a matter of law that the Defendant's Motion 
6 for Summary Judgment should be dismissed with prejudice. In making such a finding the Court has 
7 not considered the weight to be given to any particular piece of evidence, nor has it considered the 
8 credibility to be afforded any affidavit or of any of the witnesses through their depositions, and has 
9 looked at all facts most favorably in Defendant's favor. 
10 5. The Court notes that the Defendant presented no affidavit in support of his motion for 
11 summary judgment, and that he relied upon the pleadings, previous affidavits filed, and the 
12 depositions of the parties, which were ordered "published" for purposes of hearing this matter. 
13 6. The Court, for purposes of this motion, has interpreted the meaning of the trust deeds and 
14 trust deed notes, the document entitled "Purchase Agreement" and escrow agreements executed by 
15 and between the parties in connection with the transaction which is the subject matter of this lawsuit. 
16 7. Taken as a whole the Court finds that the Defendant was in fact in default of the four 
17 contracts in question after applying the Defendant's payment of July 12, 1993, and finds that the 
18 Defendant knew he was in default almost from the beginning of the execution of the trust deeds and 
19 notes with respect to the parcels. 
20 8. The Defendant knew that one of the properties, 110 West Commonwealth Ave., Salt Lake 
21 City, Utah, had been condemned to human habitation in April, 1993, and he failed to make 
22 payments on that property prior to the filing of the notice of default by the Plaintiff 
23 9. Neither the Defendant, personally, nor through third parties made any further payments 
24 on any of the trust deed notes connected with any of the properties after July 12 1993. 
25 10. Draper Bank and Trust acted as the Escrow Agent for both the Plaintiff and the 
26 Defendant with respect to receipt of funds from the Defendant on the four trust deed notes and with 
27 respect to disbursement of funds. Draper Bank and Trust did not and could not bind either party with 
28 respect to whether a default under the terms and conditions of the trust deed notes and/or the 
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1 II respective trust deeds had occurred. 
2 | 11. In respect to the funds actually received by Draper Bank and Trust from the Defendant, 
3 the Court finds their accounting and application of funds to each of the contracts is accurate. 
4 12. The Defendant never paid to Draper Bank and Trust or to the Plaintiff directly the sums 
5 which became due on March 23, 1993 on any of the trust deed notes. 
6 13. The Court finds that the payment due on March 23, 1993 was known to the Defendant 
7 and was not in the nature of a balloon payment. 
8 14. The Court finds that Draper Bank and Trust was not responsible for determining whether 
9 a default either existed or was cured as between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, and could not bind 
10 either party on the question of whether a default existed or was cured as to any particular parcel of 
11 property. 
3 2 I J 5. The properties remained m disrepair following the execution of the closing documents 
13 on February 8, 1993, some of which caused a default in the terms and conditions of the trust deeds 
14 as of July 12, 1993. 
15 16. The fact that the Defendant failed to appraise the Plaintiff of the existence of fire 
16 insurance of the four parcels prior to July 12, 1993 was a default in the terms and conditions of the 
17 trust deeds. 
18 17. The Defendant was in default of the terms and conditions of the trust deeds and the trust 
19 deed notes as of July 12. 1993 and no complete cure was effectuated by the Defendant thereafter.. 
20 18. The Court finds that in all respects the Plaintiff s properly complied with Section 57-1-1, 
21 et. seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as revised and amended, and particularly with Sections 57-1-24, 
22 57-1-25, 57-1-27, and 57-1-37, UCA in connection with his filing Notices of Default on the subject 
23 properties, and in non-judicially foreclosing the same. 
24 19. Any interest which the Defendant had in said properties, or any other persons who claim 
25 some right, title or interest in the subject properties, by, through or under him should be ordered 
26 quieted in favor of the Plaintiff. 
27 20. Any Notices of Interests and/or Notices of Liens filed against any of the properties by 
28 the Defendant or b> anyone claiming title by, through or under him should be ordered withdrawn. 
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21 Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Trust Deeds and the Trust Deed Notes 
executed by the Defendant, the Plaintiff should be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee in defending 
this action against the Defendant's claims in this matter. 
22. The Defendant's Causes of Action, including the cause of action for slander of title, 
should be ordered "dismissed with prejudice and on the merits." 
22. The Plaintiff should be entitled to his costs incurred in this action. 
DATED this / p day of June, 1997. 
BY THE COURT 
PAT B. BRIATV 
/ ? ^ S V 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Attorney and Counsellor at Law Suite 600 
6925 Union Park Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84047 
Telephone (801) 566-3373 
Fax (801) 566-8763 
June 4, 1997 
4***— - , » , , . 
Honorable Pat B Brian 
Third District Court Judge 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
240 East 4th South 
P.O. Box 1860 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Re: Tage M. Nyman 
vs. 
Daryl McDonald 
Civil No. 930906589 
Dear Judge Brian: 
In concert with your order from the bench on April 18, 1997, and pursuant to 
Rule 4.501(2), and Rule 4.504(2), Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, I served opposing 
counsel and interested parties with copies of the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order on May 27, 1997. 
Mr. Ronald G. Russell provided me with proposed changes which I have 
incorporated into the enclosed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. I have received 
no comment from Mr. Mohlman and more than five days have elapsed since service was made 
upon him. 
I am now submitting these documents to you for review and execution. 
rs vej 
)AVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney at Law 
DKS/js 
Ends. 
cc: Jay Mohlman, Esq. 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. 
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DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar Number 2993 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 600 c - £ r ". STS'CT ZO'JR i 
6925 Union Park Center ' ^ . -o c:.' : ~> net 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 JUN 1 0 1997 
Fax: (801)566-8763 
Attorney for Plaintiff: TAGE M. NYMAN ^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAGE M. NYMAN, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
DARYL MCDONALD, ) 
Defendant. ] 
> 9.£\%n%<o 
) U-ll-^l - g - o ^ r\ 
) ORDER 
) Civil No. 930 906589 
> Honorable Pat B. Brian 
28 
17 BASED UPON the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered in the above 
18 proceedings, the Court does now enter the following ORDER: 
19 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
20 1. The Court maintains jurisdiction over the parties to this action and over the subject matter 
21 of this action. 
22 2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied with prejudice and on its merits.. 
23 3. Plaintiff s motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
24 4. Any interest which the Defendant had in the properties described below, or any other 
25 persons who claim some right, title or interest in the said properties by, through or under him is 
26 ordered quieted in favor of the Plaintiff. 
27 (A) 110 West Commonwealth Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Sidwell Number: 15-24-227-0000 
001074 
Legal Description: The East 20 feet of Lot 47, Block 1, ROSELAND 
ADDITION, according to the official plat thereof, recorded in the 
Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, Utah. 
Also the following described property: 
Beginning 116.13 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 
1, ROSELAND ADDITION; and running thence West 26 feet; thence 
North 84.9 feet; thence south 56 Degrees 19' East 30.2 feet; thence 
South 69.5 feet, more or less to the place of beginning. 
(B) 1734 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Sidwell Number: 15-13-427-007-0000 
Legal Description: 
Parcel 1: Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 12, Block 7 
Five Acre Plat "A", BIG FIELD SURVEY, and running thence 
North 4.35 rods; thence West 9 rods; thence South 4.35 rods; 
Thence East 9 rods to the point of beginning. 
Parcel 2: A non-exclusive easement interest in: 
Beginning at a point 9 rods West of the Northeast corner of 
Said Lot 12, and running thence South 17.4 rods; thence West 
1 rod; thence North 17.4 rods; thence East 1 rod to the point 
of beginning. 
(C) 1646 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Sidwell Number: 15-13-280-021-0000 
Legal Description: All of Lot 1 and the South 11.7 feet of Lot 
42, Block 1, RICHLAND ADDITION, a subdivision of Lots 
1, 2, 3 and 20, Block 10, Five Acre Plat 'A \ BIG FIELD 
SURVEY. 
Less and excepting the following described parcel previously 
Conveyed to Salt Lake City Corporation: 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 1, RICHLAND 
ADDITION; thence South 89 Degrees 59 Minutes 30 Seconds 
West 148.500 feet; thence North 0 Degrees 02 Minutes 01 Seconds 
East 8.273 feet; thence South 89 Degrees 27 Minutes 59 Seconds 
East 136.862 feet; to a point on a curvature of a 17.00 foot radius 
curving to the left; thence Northeasterly along the arc of said curve 
17.772 feet to the west line of West Temple Street; thence South 
0 Degrees 02 Minutes 01 Seconds West 11.451 feet along said West 
line to the point of beginning. 
(D) 124-128 West 1700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84116 
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Sidwell Number: 05-12-280-026-0000 
Legal Description: The East Vi of Lots 2, 3, and 4, Block 1, 
RICHLAND ADDITION, according to the Official Plat 
thereof, recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder, State of Utah. 
Less and except the following: 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Lot 2, Block 1, RICHLAND 
ADDITION; thence North 89 Degrees 59 Minutes 39 Seconds 
East 149.00 feet; thence North 0 Degrees 02 Minutes 01 Seconds 
East 8.428 feet; thence North 89 Degrees 27 Minutes 59 Seconds West 
135.089 feet; thence South 89 Degrees 59 Minutes 57 Seconds West 
1.931 feet to a point on a curvature of a 17.00 foot radius curve to the 
Right; thence Northwesterly along the arc of said curve 13.298 feet 
To the East line of Jefferson Street; thence South 0 Degrees 02 Minutes 
01 Seconds West 14.642 feet along said East line to the point of 
Beginning. 
5. Any Notices of Interests and/or Notices of Liens filed against any of the properties by the 
Defendant or by anyone claiming title by, through or under him is ordered withdrawn. 
6. The Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee in defending this action against the 
Defendant's claims in this matter. 
7. The Defendant's Causes of Action, including the cause of action for slander of title, are 
ordered "dismissed with prejudice and on the merits." 
8. The Plaintiff is entitled to his costs incurred in this action. 
DATED this //) day of June, 1997. 
BY THE 
< C < - ^ 
PAT B. BRIAN 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ' 
< / / V ^ , 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JAY R. MOHLMAN 
Attorney for Daryl McDonald 
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Jay R. Mohlman, 5113 
Scott M. Ellsworth, 7514 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tel (801) 532-1900 
Fax (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAGE NYMAN, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DARYL MCDONALD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 930906589 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Notice is hereby given that Defendant Daryl McDonald, by and through counsel, Jay R. 
Mohlman and Scott M. Ellsworth of Nielsen & Senior, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the 
Order granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and the other items contained in that 
Order of the Honorable Pat B. Brian entered in this matter on the 10th day of June, 1997. 
DATED this IJNL day of July, 1997. S \ 
Jay l^ MfiJhlman 
Scou/M. Ellsworth 
of NIELSEN & SENIOR 
70490.MC169.001 
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